The Ideological Quandary: How Ideology is Undermining China's Drive to Prepare Forces for Combat

 

China’s  PLA combat readiness, under President Xi's direction, resembles a thoroughbred racehorse burdened with an ideological saddle, rendering it sluggish in comparison to the sleek Western military machinery. 

In the dimly lit room of the PLA's August First Film Studio, a pivotal scene from the 2011 movie "Skyfighters" captures the essence of a deeply entrenched dynamic within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Here, a conflict emerges, symbolizing a broader challenge. The air-force division commander's fervent desire to prepare his troops for combat clashes with the reservations of his youthful deputy, who points to poor visibility and the need for exhausted pilots to rest. The escalating dispute attracts the attention of a third officer, the political commissar.

The political commissar's principal role within the PLA is to uphold the Communist Party's control over the military apparatus. In this specific scenario, he intervenes authoritatively, issuing a firm command to quell the quarrel: "Don't quarrel!" His resolution takes the form of a compromise – the troops will engage in preparation for takeoff without actually conducting the flight. After the exercise concludes, the division commander commends his troops, commending them for possessing an indomitable spirit that exults in the anticipation of war and dares to win.

Though the dialogue in "Skyfighters" may not be hailed as cinematic excellence, it effectively encapsulates the PLA's leadership ethos, wherein ideological control reigns supreme. Founded in 1927 as the armed wing of the Communist Party of China, the PLA has, over the years, preserved its dual role as both a military force and a political entity. Critical decisions have traditionally been the province of party committees within the PLA, each presided over by a political officer, commonly referred to as a commissar. The prevalence of political officers extends to most PLA units, including naval vessels, where they fulfill a multifaceted role. Beyond indoctrinating troops and overseeing morale, they possess the authority to intervene in operational matters and, under certain circumstances, supplant a commander. While, in theory, political officers share equal authority with their military counterparts, their leadership positions within party committees often afford them a more considerable sphere of influence. This intricate and interwoven system, while reflective of historical precedent, presents challenges that extend beyond the silver screen.

This convoluted system may seem ripe for reform, but under the leadership of Xi Jinping, it has experienced rejuvenation rather than restructuring. In 2014, Xi hosted a conference in Gutian county, Fujian province, where he reinforced the role of political control in the military, echoing Mao Zedong's doctrine from 85 years earlier. Xi identified ten "outstanding problems" within the PLA, emphasizing a lack of revolutionary spirit and ideals. His solution? Strengthening political work.

Xi's Delicate Balancing Act

Xi's perspective appears to be that there is no inherent conflict between political indoctrination and military readiness. In fact, he views such ideological control as vital to counter information warfare, as seen in the war in Ukraine. However, the reality on the ground presents a different picture, marked by tensions between commanders and political officers. In general, the political officers typically specialize in political work throughout their careers, often lacking a deep understanding of operational matters. PLA-linked publications have openly acknowledged this issue, with some officers becoming more observers in training and amateurs in battle.

Despite efforts to redefine the roles and status of political officers in 2020, problems persist. Too much emphasis remains on the speaking and writing skills of political officers rather than their combat abilities.

This problematic command structure becomes particularly challenging on China's nuclear-missile submarines, now engaged in regular patrols. These submarines must maintain communication silence for extended periods, raising questions about who has the final authority in critical situations. Comparisons with the Soviet Union, which also had political commissars in its armed forces, reveal that the PLA's approach diverges. While Soviet commissars generally empowered commanding officers with ultimate authority, the PLA's commissars hold more influence within their units, leading to potential confusion and decision-making challenges.

Another obstacle faced by the PLA is the increasing emphasis on political education, which consumes a substantial portion of troops' time. Soldiers and officers are expected to study Xi Jinping's ideological doctrines extensively, diverting their attention from combat training. This approach not only detracts from combat readiness but also fails to achieve its intended purpose. Xi's emphasis on political work was initially meant to address the indiscipline that plagued the PLA under previous leadership. However, the sudden dismissal of top generals in the rocket force in July exposed lingering indiscipline in the upper ranks.

Xi Jinping's resolute commitment to strengthening the Communist Party's control within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) speaks volumes about his understanding of the pivotal role military loyalty plays in China's intricate political landscape. He perceives a formidable and unwavering PLA as an indispensable cornerstone in the realization of his ambitious "China Dream," which envisions a powerful and prosperous China on the global stage. For Xi, a military that not only aligns with the party's objectives but also remains firmly under its sway is essential for maintaining domestic stability and safeguarding the party's grip on power.

It is worth pointing out that Xi's steadfast resolve to prevent a scenario reminiscent of the Soviet Union's collapse fuels his unswerving commitment to the commissar system. He is acutely aware of the historical context, having grown up in an environment where military families vied for prominent party positions. This firsthand experience has endowed him with a deep understanding of the complexities of military loyalty and the inherent challenges that can arise when the armed forces become too autonomous.

The specter of the Soviet Union's disintegration haunts Xi, serving as a stark reminder of the perils of losing control over the military. He attributes a portion of the Soviet collapse to the Kremlin's inability to effectively manage the armed forces. The lessons of history are not lost on him, and he is determined to avoid a similar fate for China. His experiences as secretary to a defense minister have also provided him with insight into the PLA's role in post-Mao power struggles, reinforcing the significance of party control over the military.

In a practical sense, while Xi Jinping's emphasis on ideology and unwavering political control within the PLA may seem consistent with his vision of a robust and obedient military force, it is not without its challenges. The prioritization of ideological indoctrination and the amplified influence of political officers within the PLA invariably hinder combat readiness. Recent dismissals of high-ranking generals further underscore ongoing issues of indiscipline within the ranks. Nevertheless, Xi's commitment to maintaining the party's iron grip on the PLA is deeply rooted in China's historical context and his apprehension of a military that could potentially diverge from the party's agenda. It remains a precarious balance that Xi must navigate as he endeavors to bolster China's military capabilities and secure the nation's position on the global stage.