The End of the Road? Wagner’s Tinzaouaten Defeat Exposes Moscow’s African Illusion

 

The defeat of Wagner Group in Tinzaouaten suggests that even Russia’s best-laid plans are no match for the local rebels’ understanding of their own backyard. In fact, this humiliating defeat in Tinzaouaten shows that sometimes the only thing mercenaries can conquer is their own incompetence.

When you put all your eggs in one basket, especially a basket held by mercenaries with questionable loyalty, you might just find yourself scrambling. This is the conundrum facing Russia and its Wagner Group in Mali, a partnership that once seemed poised to be a cornerstone of Moscow’s strategy in Africa but now reveals cracks that could shatter Russia's ambitions on the continent.

The recent debacle in Tinzaouaten, Mali, where the Wagner Group and Malian forces were dealt a heavy blow by Tuareg rebels and al-Qaida affiliates, underscores the perilous path Russia has chosen in Africa. In late July 2024, a joint operation meant to stabilize the region near the Algerian border instead spiraled into chaos, leaving upward of 80 Wagner mercenaries and over 40 Malian soldiers dead. The loss of Nikita Fedyanin, who managed Wagner’s popular Telegram channel "The Grey Zone," added a symbolic defeat to the tangible losses on the ground.

This disaster in Tinzaouaten is more than just a military setback; it is a strategic blow that challenges Moscow’s broader ambitions in Africa. Russia has invested heavily in cultivating relationships with African nations, particularly through the use of private military companies like Wagner. These mercenaries have been presented as the solution to security woes in countries like Mali, where Western forces, particularly French troops, have withdrawn after years of a grinding counterterrorism mission.

However, the Tinzaouaten incident signals to African leaders the inherent risks of relying on Moscow-backed mercenaries. The Wagner Group’s tactics, often characterized by brutal and indiscriminate violence, may have brought temporary gains, such as the retaking of Kidal in November 2023, but they also exacerbate existing conflicts. The indiscriminate nature of Wagner's operations often alienates local populations, making it clear that while they may be effective in the short term, they are far from a sustainable solution.

The history of Wagner's operations in Africa further complicates Russia's strategy. The group's earlier failure in Mozambique in 2019, where Wagner forces quickly withdrew after proving ill-equipped and unprepared, casts a long shadow over their current endeavors in Mali. Although the situations differ, the underlying theme is the same: Wagner's promises often fall short when faced with the complex realities on the ground. This has not gone unnoticed by Mali's junta leaders, who may now be questioning the wisdom of their reliance on these Russian mercenaries.

Moreover, the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023 and the subsequent creation of the Africa Corps by Moscow to take over Wagner's operations have only added to the uncertainty. The Africa Corps, controlled directly by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, was supposed to ensure continuity and expand Russia's influence across the continent. Yet, the Tinzaouaten incident demonstrates that simply rebranding Wagner under state control does not address the fundamental issues that plague these mercenaries. The loss in Tinzaouaten not only raises questions about Wagner's effectiveness but also about the Kremlin's ability to manage its African ambitions through these proxies.

Russia’s broader strategy in Africa hinges on the success of these private military companies. The Tinzaouaten setback, therefore, is a significant blow to Moscow's plans. This incident could very well serve as a wake-up call for other African nations that have entertained the idea of inviting Wagner or similar Russian forces into their countries. The harsh reality is that Wagner’s presence may bring more instability than security, and the loss of life, both Malian and Russian, is a high price to pay for such unreliable support.

The stakes are high for Moscow. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s reassurances to Mali after the Tinzaouaten debacle may calm nerves for now, but words are cheap, especially when the situation on the ground tells a different story. Russia’s ambitions in Mali are not purely altruistic; they are deeply intertwined with economic interests, particularly in the gold sector. The November 2023 agreement to construct Mali’s largest gold refinery is a clear example of Russia’s desire to entrench itself economically in the country. Yet, as the security situation deteriorates, these economic projects may be jeopardized, further undermining Russia’s position.

There is a twisted irony in the aftermath of the Tinzaouaten incident. While Wagner's losses might be seen as a sign of commitment by some in Mali—mercenaries willing to die alongside local forces—the broader implications are far more troubling. Moscow’s strategy of using mercenaries as the tip of its spear in Africa is increasingly proving to be a double-edged sword. The very forces intended to secure Russian interests may instead destabilize them, leading to more incidents like Tinzaouaten.

In a twist of geopolitical gamesmanship, Ukraine has been accused—though it vehemently denies the charge—of providing intelligence to Tuareg rebels, which supposedly contributed to Wagner's defeat. Whether true or not, the mere suggestion has led Mali to sever diplomatic ties with Ukraine, followed by neighboring Niger. This highlights the complex and often unpredictable nature of Russia's involvement in Africa. The blowback from Wagner's failures could ripple far beyond the continent, affecting Russia's global standing and its ongoing conflict with Ukraine.

As Russia grapples with the fallout from the Tinzaouaten incident, one thing is clear: the reliance on Wagner and similar groups is not just a flawed strategy—it is a dangerous one. Moscow’s attempts to distance itself from Wagner’s failures, while still benefiting from its successes, are becoming increasingly untenable. The notion that Russia can wash its hands of Wagner’s blunders while reaping the rewards of its conquests is as fantastical as expecting a mercenary to work for free. At some point, the bill comes due, and for Moscow, the price of its African ambitions may be more than it bargained for.

In the end, Moscow’s strategy in Africa may be less about winning hearts and minds and more about keeping a straight face while the ground crumbles beneath its feet. After all, when you entrust your empire-building to mercenaries, you might find that the only thing being built is a house of cards, ready to topple at the first gust of wind.