Mossad Turns Autocrats Into Freelancers: Haniyeh’s Assassination in Tehran

 

Mossad hiring Iranian agents to plant bombs in Haniyeh’s residence proves that loyalty in autocratic regimes is only a paycheck away. The truth is, when Mossad hired Iranian agents, it turned espionage into a global gig economy, where even autocrats can moonlight for extra cash.

The recent revelations that Mossad hired Iranian agents to plant bombs in Ismail Haniyeh's residence raise critical questions about the vulnerability and corruption within autocratic regimes like Iran, North Korea, and Russia. These events demonstrate that anyone, even within these tightly controlled societies, can be bought for the right price, undermining the very foundation of their supposed loyalty and ideological commitment.

Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, executed an audacious plan to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh, the political head of Hamas, a designated terrorist group by multiple countries including the United States and Israel. The plot involved Iranian security agents who planted explosives in a building in Tehran, where Haniyeh was staying. This incident not only highlights the extensive reach of Mossad but also exposes the deep cracks in Iran's security apparatus.

The operation was initially scheduled for May, during the funeral of Ebrahim Raisi, Iran's former president. However, it was postponed due to the high likelihood of failure caused by large crowds. Instead, the agents planted bombs in three separate rooms of the IRGC guesthouse. Despite the sophisticated security measures of the IRGC, the agents managed to enter and exit multiple rooms within minutes, as confirmed by CCTV footage. This ability to infiltrate such a high-security area raises the question: how secure are these regimes if their security personnel can be so easily compromised?

The detonation of the explosives from abroad at 2 AM on a Wednesday killed Haniyeh, who was in Tehran for the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian, the new Iranian president. This event was not only a significant blow to Hamas but also a profound humiliation for Iran. The IRGC, responsible for the protection of high-ranking officials, was caught off-guard, leading to a frantic blame game within its ranks. Esmail Qaani, the commander of the IRGC Quds force, has reportedly been summoning people for questioning, with threats of firings, arrests, and even executions. The Supreme Leader has demanded answers, prioritizing the resolution of this security breach over immediate retaliation.

The implications of this incident extend beyond Iran. It suggests that no regime, regardless of its authoritarian grip, is immune to infiltration. Mossad's ability to recruit agents from the Ansar al-Mahdi protection unit, an elite IRGC unit, underscores that loyalty can be bought. This scenario is not unique to Iran. North Korea and Russia, known for their autocratic rule and stringent control over their security forces, are equally susceptible. If Iranian agents can be compromised, who is to say that North Korean or Russian operatives cannot be similarly bought?

This situation brings to mind the broader issue of corruption within autocratic regimes. Despite their public displays of unity and strength, these governments often harbor deep-seated corruption and discontent among their ranks. The economic disparities and lack of political freedom create an environment where money can become a powerful motivator. For instance, Iran, struggling with severe economic sanctions and internal strife, presents fertile ground for such infiltrations.

In the case of North Korea, decades of economic isolation and the regime's brutal control over its population have not eradicated the potential for corruption. Reports of black markets and bribery within the country indicate that even the most repressive regimes cannot completely eliminate the influence of money. Similarly, in Russia, the combination of economic hardship and political repression has led to a pervasive culture of corruption, where loyalty to the regime can be swayed by financial incentives.

The assassination of Haniyeh also casts a spotlight on Israel's strategic capabilities and the lengths it is willing to go to protect its interests. The use of Iranian agents not only demonstrates Mossad's operational reach but also its deep understanding of Iran's internal vulnerabilities. Ali Younisi, Iran's former intelligence minister, acknowledged in 2020 that all officials of the Islamic Republic should be worried about their lives, highlighting the persistent threat posed by Mossad.

Furthermore, the timing of the assassination, coinciding with Masoud Pezeshkian's first day in office, adds another layer of intrigue. Pezeshkian had campaigned on a platform of reform and international diplomacy, distancing himself from the provocative policies of his predecessors. Some speculate that the IRGC, disapproving of his views, may have intentionally allowed the security lapse to undermine his credibility. This internal conflict within Iran’s political and military elite further illustrates the complexity and instability of autocratic regimes.

Dr. Yousef Pezeshkian, the new president's son, emphasized that Iran's priority should not be a war with Israel but rather addressing domestic issues such as poverty, corruption, and inequality. His statement underscores the internal challenges faced by Iran and the need for social reforms to counter external threats. Yet, the question remains: Can Iran achieve these reforms while grappling with such profound security breaches and internal discord?

Without putting it in so many words, the Mossad operation in Tehran serves as a stark reminder that autocratic regimes, despite their external show of strength, are not impervious to infiltration and corruption. The ease with which Iranian agents were recruited by Mossad highlights the vulnerability of these regimes and raises critical questions about their stability. As long as economic disparities and political repression persist, the loyalty of security personnel in countries like Iran, North Korea, and Russia can be easily swayed. This incident should serve as a wake-up call to these regimes, urging them to address their internal weaknesses before they can effectively counter external threats.