Hacking Phones is Too Easy: The Need for Tougher Phone Security Regulations

 

The ease with which phones can be hacked through outdated protocols like SS7 highlights a critical security failure that regulators have ignored for far too long. Without decisive regulatory action, the rampant hacking of phones will continue to endanger personal privacy and national security.

The vulnerability of global phone networks to hacking has been a persistent issue for over a decade, yet regulators have largely turned a blind eye to the problem. The underlying technology, Signalling System 7 (SS7), was designed in an era when security was less of a concern and trust among a few state-controlled telecom companies sufficed. However, as the telecommunications landscape has evolved, SS7 has become a glaring weak point, easily exploited by malicious actors. It is high time for regulators to step up and enforce stringent measures to secure our communication networks.

The origins of phone hacking date back to the mid-1960s when so-called "phone phreaks" discovered that blowing a toy whistle into a phone could manipulate the system to make free calls. This primitive hacking method was countered by the introduction of SS7 in 1980, which separated voice and signaling channels. Despite its initial success in securing networks, SS7's design was based on a foundation of trust rather than robust security measures. This has left it, and its successor Diameter, susceptible to various forms of cyber-attacks.

For over 15 years, experts have warned that SS7 could be abused to track users, intercept communications, or inject spyware. Russia, for instance, has used SS7 to monitor dissidents abroad, and in 2018, the United Arab Emirates reportedly exploited it to locate and abduct a fugitive princess. More recently, American cybersecurity officials reported similar attacks to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), underscoring the domestic threat.

The problem lies in SS7's trust-based architecture, which was adequate when only a few telecoms accessed the system. Today, thousands of private companies can access it, and the complexity of global networks has only increased. Mobile phones frequently roam across providers' jurisdictions, necessitating seamless handovers. Text messages, often used for critical transactions like banking authentication, are particularly vulnerable. The 2018 Emirati attack, which involved multiple countries and lightly regulated territories like the Channel Islands, highlights the global and intricate nature of the threat.

While end-to-end encrypted messaging apps like iMessage, Signal, or WhatsApp offer some protection, they are not a panacea. These apps cannot hide a user's location as phones must still connect to mobile network towers. Additionally, relying on apps for two-factor authentication codes, instead of SMS, can mitigate some risks, but this is not a comprehensive solution.

In March, the FCC announced it was exploring countermeasures against location tracking via SS7 and Diameter. However, American mobile operators have already started retiring SS7, yet much of the world continues to use it, and Diameter remains vulnerable. Technical measures such as filtering to detect and block suspicious traffic exist but are underutilized due to their complexity and cost. Many telecom companies resist implementing these filters because they are expensive and can disrupt legitimate data flows.

This resistance highlights a classic collective-action problem: if only a few companies secure SS7 while others do not, the entire system remains compromised. Hence, national regulators must intervene. The reluctance of telecom firms to invest in necessary security measures due to technical challenges and costs underscores the need for regulatory mandates.

Regulators have the authority and responsibility to enforce security standards across the board. The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which imposes strict data protection requirements, serves as a model for how regulatory frameworks can drive compliance and enhance security. A similar approach is needed for telecom security, where regulators set mandatory standards for securing signaling systems like SS7 and Diameter.

Given the international nature of telecommunications, global coordination is crucial. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and other international bodies must work together to establish and enforce global security standards. Collaborative efforts can help share best practices, provide technical assistance to countries lagging in security measures, and ensure a unified approach to tackling vulnerabilities.

Furthermore, advancements in technology offer promising avenues for enhancing network security. Blockchain technology, for instance, could be used to create more secure and transparent communication protocols. Continuous research and development in cybersecurity are essential to staying ahead of malicious actors.

The ease with which phones can be hacked through vulnerabilities in SS7 and Diameter is a pressing issue that demands immediate attention. For too long, regulators have avoided addressing this problem, leaving global communication networks exposed to exploitation. It is imperative that national and international regulators take decisive action to mandate security measures, ensuring that the digital infrastructure we rely on daily is robust and secure. The time to act is now, before more individuals and nations fall victim to these preventable vulnerabilities.