For years, Hamas maintained political dominance in Gaza and simultaneously improved its military capabilities. This unexpected development caught Israel by surprise as its defense establishment had presumed that Hamas had opted to avoid large-scale confrontations in recent years, believing that its capacity for such actions was constrained. Regrettably, this presumption proved to be incorrect.
The recent tragic events in the Middle East have deeply shaken the world. Over the past week, Hamas militants orchestrated a series of shocking and unforeseen terror attacks against Israel. These reprehensible actions resulted in the loss of over 1,300 lives, the majority of whom were innocent civilians. Additionally, more than 3,200 individuals sustained injuries, and approximately 150 people were taken hostage. These harrowing incidents have compelled me to embark on a comprehensive exploration into the size and extent of Hamas's presence and influence. The outcomes of my research are both chilling and thought-provoking. The central question that looms is: Just how potent and entrenched is Hamas in the region?
Hamas, which stands for the
Islamic Resistance Movement, was established in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a
Palestinian religious leader. This happened during the turbulent period known
as the first intifada, when many Palestinians rose up against Israel's control
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Yassin had previously become associated with
the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the world's oldest Islamist organizations,
during his time in Cairo. He envisioned Hamas as the political offshoot of the
Brotherhood, specifically in the Gaza region. In its initial charter released
in 1988, Hamas asserted its primary mission: to free Palestine from Israeli
rule, which it considered illegitimate. In pursuit of this goal, the
organization launched its first attacks against Israeli military targets in
1989 and later formally established a military branch in the early 1990s. It
made its opposition to the Oslo accords, which sought to establish peace
between Israel and the Palestinians, clear by resorting to suicide bombings
within Israeli territories.
Hamas's emergence and
actions during this period marked a significant development in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Their dedication to resistance and their militant
activities made them a prominent player in the ongoing struggle for control
over Palestinian territories, and their ideologies and actions have continued
to shape the complex dynamics in the region for many years to come.
In the beginning, Hamas
wasn't very strong in both politics and the military. However, over time, it
gained more political influence among the Palestinian people. In 2006, a year
after Israel left Gaza, Hamas won most of the seats in a Palestinian election.
Later on, they formed a new government together with Fatah, which was their
rival group with a focus on Palestinian nationalism. Then, in June 2007, after
a short civil war, Hamas took full control of Gaza, leaving Fatah in charge of
the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. As a response, Israel and Egypt put
a tight blockade on Gaza in 2007. This action seriously hurt Gaza's economy and
basically trapped its people in a very small area. Since then, there haven't
been any more elections. Hamas has been running Gaza like a one-party state,
which some Palestinians there aren't happy about. However, many Palestinians
still see Hamas as more capable and less corrupt than the struggling
Palestinian Authority.
Despite the challenging
blockade, Hamas managed to slowly strengthen its military capabilities. By
2008, when they launched their first war against Israel, they had built a
well-organized military structure and trained thousands of fighters. They
received support from Iran, Syria, and Hizbullah, a militant group in Lebanon
backed by Iran. During this time, they had been launching simple rockets for
about a year. However, these rocket attacks didn't have much impact on the
military situation, and in response, Israel launched strikes on Gaza that resulted
in the deaths of approximately 1,200-1,400 Palestinians.
Hamas continued to evolve
its tactics over the years. In 2014, during their third war with Israel
(following a second one in 2012), their combat capabilities had significantly
expanded. They had more rockets with greater range, and they became more
skilled at hiding their military facilities. They developed a network of
offensive tunnels into Israel and another for smuggling weapons from Egypt.
They also improved the effectiveness of their ground combat forces, who engaged
in battle for 50 days. By 2021, Hamas had the capacity to fire 4,300 rockets at
Israel within just 11 days (compared to approximately 4,500 rockets over 50
days in 2014). However, despite these advancements, Hamas remained outmatched
by Israel. In 2021, their rocket barrages killed a dozen people, and in
response, Israel launched airstrikes and attacks, causing further destruction
in the already struggling Gaza Strip and resulting in the deaths of over 200
people.
For a span of two years,
Hamas seemed to be deliberately avoiding escalating the conflict with Israel.
This tactic led many to make the mistaken assumption that the prominent figures
within the group's leadership were primarily focused on strengthening their
control over Gaza, the territory they govern. However, the surprising attack
that occurred on October 7th took everyone by surprise, as it displayed a level
of sophistication far beyond any of their previous actions. In this daring
move, Hamas targeted Israel's surveillance systems, rendering them ineffective
by disabling security cameras. Additionally, they employed advanced electronic
warfare techniques and successfully jammed Israeli communication systems, as
reported by Reuters. These developments strongly suggest that Hamas has been
actively working to enhance its military technologies over an extended period,
possibly with some form of external support, which could potentially come from
Iran.
Despite the significant
asymmetry between the two sides, with Israel's Defense Forces (IDF) possessing
both numerical and equipment advantages, Hamas managed to carry out this
attack. Israel estimates that Hamas has around 30,000 fighters in its ranks. In
response to the escalating tension, Israel called up an additional 300,000
reservists to join its already substantial force of approximately 170,000
active soldiers. Furthermore, the IDF boasts a significantly larger arsenal,
which includes missile boats and tanks. This lopsided power dynamic creates a
palpable sense of apprehension among the two million civilians residing in
Gaza, who are left bracing for the potential consequences and impact of any
further escalation or conflict.
Notes
Epstein, J., & Lee, L.
(2023, October 13). Israel Dropped More Bombs on Gaza in 6 Days than the
US-Led Coalition Dropped in Any Month Fighting ISIS. Retrieved from Yahoo
News: https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-dropped-more-bombs-gaza-211449462.html
Jefferis, J. (2016). Hamas:
Terrorism, Governance, and Its Future in Middle East Politics. Westport,
CT: Praeger .
Kingsley , P., &
Bergman, R. (2023, October 13). How Hamas Overran Southern Israel and Killed
1,300. Retrieved from New York Times:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/13/world/middleeast/hamas-israel-attack-gaza.html
Milton-Edwards, B., &
Farrell, S. (2010). Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement. Malden, MA:
Polity Press.
Robinson, K. (2023, October
9). What Is Hamas? Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations:
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas
The Economist. (2023,
October 10). The Economist Explains: How Powerful is Hamas? . Retrieved
from
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/10/10/how-powerful-is-hamas
U.S. Department of State.
(2003, August 22). U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six
Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities. Retrieved from Press Release:
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/js672
U.S. Department of State.
(2023). Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Retrieved from Bureau of
Counterterrorism: https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/
Zegart, A. (2023, October
11). Israel’s Intelligence Disaster: How the Security Establishment Could
Have Underestimated the Hamas Threat. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/israels-intelligence-disaster
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