Failed States in West Africa: The Influence of Fanatics and Coup Plotters

 

In the heart of Africa's Sahel, the toppling of Niger's President, Mohamed Bazoum, resembles a delicate house of cards collapsing, unleashing an unprecedented crisis that teeters on the brink of igniting a regional war. The stability of the entire region now dangles precariously, as neighboring countries find themselves entangled in a high-stakes power struggle, torn between supporting Mr. Bazoum or the junta-led forces. It is as if they are caught in a tense tug of war for control and influence.

Mohamed Bazoum, the president of Niger, knew very well about the problems caused by coups in neighboring countries like Burkina Faso and Mali. These coups weakened their fight against the violent jihadist groups in the Sahel region. In an interview with The Economist last May, he explained how military rule harms Niger's army and hinders international military support, making it harder to deal with the jihadist violence. He believed that good governance was crucial to protect the country from coups. However, on July 26th, he was removed from power by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the head of his presidential guard. The toppling of Mr. Bazoum, who took office in 2021 in Niger's first-ever democratic transfer of power, caused a serious crisis. There is a fear that it could lead to a regional war. Even if that doesn't happen, the coup will likely have a severe impact on efforts to fight the dangerous jihadist insurgency in the Sahel, where thousands of lives have been lost in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

The most immediate risk is that Niger's neighboring countries might get involved in the conflict, supporting either the coup or Mr. Bazoum. Nigeria's President, Bola Tinubu, who had been imprisoned during a past military dictatorship, strongly opposes coups. When he became the Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), he declared that the regional bloc would not tolerate a series of coups, referring to the five that happened in three member countries since 2020.

Niger is being tested with Mr. Tinubu's policy, and ECOWAS has said it will use military action if Mr. Bazoum isn't put back into power by August 6th. Some people in the area think it's just a bluff, but others in the West believe the threat is serious. The reason is simple: Mr. Tinubu strongly dislikes coup d'etats because he was once put in prison by them. Niger says it will defend itself if ECOWAS forces intervene, and Burkina Faso and Mali, which are both under military rule, will see it as a declaration of war. At least four European countries, including France, are evacuating their citizens, perhaps expecting trouble.

There is still a chance that if they talk, the immediate crisis in Niger can be stopped. But if they don't fully restore democratic rule there, it will be difficult to stop thousands of extremists linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State. These extremists have been causing a lot of violence in the region called the Sahel, which is a dry and poor area just south of the Sahara Desert. It has become the main place for global jihadist terror, even more than the Middle East.

Over the past ten years, at least 42,000 people have been killed in the Sahel countries due to conflicts with jihadists. And about 3.3 million people have had to leave their homes because of this violence. This problem is not only in the Sahel but also in places like Somalia and around Lake Chad, where more than 100,000 lives have been lost to terrorism since 2014.

It is worrying that jihadists are winning the war in the Sahel, except in Niger. From 2021 to 2022, over 10,000 people died in the region, and this year, it looks like it will be even bloodier. The militants are also crossing borders and threatening richer and more populated coastal countries like Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Togo. The violence and coups in the Sahel are partly because some civilian governments couldn't bring order and were overthrown in Mali (in 2020) and Burkina Faso (in 2022). And when coups happen, they tend to lead to more coups. The gun-toting men behind these coups claim they want to save their countries from jihadists, but they haven't done a good job running things after taking power.

Let us look at Mali’s experience in 2012. Back then, they were not only fighting jihadists but also separatists from the Tuareg group. Luckily, a fast French intervention stopped the two groups from attacking the capital, Bamako. They made a fragile peace deal with the separatists, but it didn't last long, and disarmament didn't go as planned. The jihadists kept causing harm despite efforts by local forces, French commandos, and 13,000 UN peacekeepers to protect the capital and big towns like Gao and Timbuktu. Sadly, the jihadists still gained control over much of the countryside. The government's inability to stop the violence led to a coup in 2020 because people were getting more and more frustrated.

The situation in Mali has become even more troubling because the junta, the group in charge, couldn't stop the violence. They asked French forces to leave and turned to a Russian mercenary group called Wagner for help. But even with Wagner, things didn't get better. In a village called Moura, over 500 people were killed in just four days by the army and these Wagner mercenaries. Many innocent people lost their lives, and terrible things happened, like soldiers stealing and raping local women. With the UN peacekeepers leaving, the violence may get even worse, and some worry there could be more fighting with separatists.

Burkina Faso is also facing a tough situation. After two coups, their new leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, declared "total war" on jihadists, but it didn't work. Most of the jihadist-related deaths in the central Sahel this year happened in Burkina Faso. Many people had to leave their homes, and some towns are surrounded by jihadists. The government only controls a small part of the country, and things seem to be falling apart.

Now, the jihadists are expanding into coastal states too, and although the number of deaths there is not as high as in the Sahel, it's still increasing. In Togo, the president said that soldiers and civilians have been killed, and they expect a long fight. Benin also experienced deadly attacks last year, and the violence is getting worse there too. It's a very challenging and dangerous situation for all these countries.

A few countries along the coast are working hard to protect themselves from the attacks. Ivory Coast is one example, where the government is spending money on improving roads, buildings, and other essential things in border areas to make jihadism less attractive to people. As a result, the attacks there have reduced. Ghana has not experienced any jihadist attacks yet, but many young men from Ghana have been recruited by jihadists and sent to training camps in the Sahel region. Later, they return to their villages. Ghana's defense minister says that the risk of terrorism is genuine and something they need to be careful about.

Jokes and Treats

You might have thought Niger would be in big trouble, but surprisingly, they are handling their problems well. They face three sources of instability: jihadist groups causing havoc like in Mali and Burkina Faso, bandits coming from Nigeria, and a conflict near Lake Chad with another jihadist group called Boko Haram. Even with all this chaos, fewer people were killed in Niger during the first six months of this year compared to previous years.

The reason Niger is doing better is because of Mr. Bazoum's unique approach to fighting the jihadists. He improved government services, talked with the terrorists (yes, you heard it right!), and got lots of help from Western military forces. To understand why this worked, just listen to the jihadists themselves. When asked why they joined the radical groups, they didn't mention religion; they were attracted to earthly things like money, women, meat, and even motorbikes. For some, looting in a poor place like the Sahel can be more tempting than honest work.

Before joining the al-Qaeda-linked group Nusrat al-Islam, one man named Hassan Ahmad was scared and upset because soldiers suspected many young men of being jihadists, even if they were not. The jihadists also used fear to recruit new members. Mr. Ahmad's job was so terrible; he had to cut off the heads of men who refused to join. But luckily, Mr. Moussa recently left the jihadist group and started a plan to turn away from violence, thanks to Mr. Bazoum's support. The government got help from relatives and trusted people to convince the jihadists to stop fighting.

Mr. Bazoum also used other ways to talk with people. He tried to reduce fights between farmers and semi-nomadic herders, who are often from the Fulani group. The jihadists took advantage of these clashes to recruit fighters, pretending to protect the herders. By making peace, the violence in that area has gone down a lot. Even one of the big jihadist groups, the Islamic State Sahel, quietly agreed to a peace pact signed by community leaders.

Incredibly, Mr. Bazoum had secret ceasefires with the jihadists (without even writing them down!). They made an agreement that if the government sent food to a certain place, the jihadists would not attack there for six months. It may seem strange, but it seems to be helping Niger find some peace and keep people safe.

According to a report from the Crisis Group, a think-tank, the government has been engaging with Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliated coalition. JNIM commanders reportedly conveyed a message that they would refrain from attacking the government if the government refrained from attacking them. Additionally, the group requested the government to release certain prisoners, a request that was granted.

However, the current situation is becoming increasingly precarious. General Tchiani, in his first speech since the coup, openly criticized Mr. Bazoum's security policies, particularly concerning the release of jihadists. As a result of the coup, the regime also arrested Mr. Bazoum's interior minister, a crucial supporter of local peace deals. Niger has made efforts to reduce army atrocities that might drive young men towards jihadism, but in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso, such atrocities have risen sharply under military rule.

Furthermore, the coup raises doubts about the continuation of the second significant aspect of Mr. Bazoum's successful approach: close military cooperation with the West. France has approximately 1,500 forces operating alongside the Nigerien army, and the United States has over 1,000 military personnel in the country, primarily deployed at various drone bases. These cooperative efforts have yielded positive outcomes on the front line, leading to improved capabilities, better equipment, and enhanced intelligence for Niger's forces, as reported by a Nigerien gendarme who patrols the border and has received training from Western forces.

Despite these past successes, the current situation presents a risk of unraveling the progress made thus far, putting the stability and security of the region in jeopardy. The junta's actions suggest a swift shift in its stance towards Niger's Western supporters, who have unequivocally condemned the coup. On July 30th, the coup instigators incited crowds to attack the French embassy, attempting to set it ablaze. These provocative acts, coupled with the military rule, are likely to diminish the willingness of France, America, and their European allies to maintain their collaboration and training with Niger's army. Regrettably, this may lead to a rise in terrorist attacks.

Prior to the coup, Niger offered a glimmer of hope that the jihadist threat in the Sahel region could be quelled, not solely through the use of force, but through a government that engaged in dialogue and genuinely addressed the needs of its people. If the coup remains unchallenged, this hope will fade away, plunging the central Sahel and its population of over 70 million into darkness. Simply put, the promise of a secure Sahel now hung like a delicate thread, woven by the aspirations of its people. Does the coup's persistence threaten to unravel this thread, leaving the Sahel's security hanging by this thread?

 

 

 

 

Notes

Aljazeera. (2023, June 23). Nigeria’s President Tinubu Chosen as New West Africa Bloc Chief. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/10/nigerias-president-tinubu-chosen-as-new-west-africa-bloc-chief

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. (2023, February 8). The Sahel: Geopolitical Transition at the Center of an Ever-Worsening Crisis. Retrieved from ACLED: Conflict Watchlist 2023: https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2023/sahel/

Burke, J. (2023, May 20). Russian Mercenaries Behind Slaughter of 500 in Mali Village, UN Report Finds. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds

Celso , A. N., & Nalbandov, R. (2016). The Crisis of the Africanm State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the Twenty-First Century. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press.

International Crisis Group. (2021, December 10). Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition JNIM. Retrieved from Crisis Group: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-enabling-dialogue-jihadist-coalition-jnim

Peltier, E., & Saley, O. H. (2023, August 6). War, Mediation or Silence? Coup Leaders in Niger Face Decision Time. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/06/world/africa/niger-coup-deadline.html

Peltier, S., & Maclean, R. (2022, August 15). French Soldiers Quit Mali After 9 Years, Billions Spent and Many Lives Lost. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/15/world/africa/mali-france-military-operation.html

Raineri, L. (2022). Explaining the Rise of Jihadism in Africa: The Crucial Case of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara. Terrorism and Political Violence, 34(8), 1632-1646.

The Economist. (2023, August 1). Chaos in the Sahel: Fanatics and Putschists are Creating Failed States in West Africa. Retrieved August 6, 2023, from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/01/fanatics-and-putschists-are-creating-failed-states-in-west-africa